

Message Text

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ACTION L-03

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 OES-09 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
ACDA-12 CIAE-00 INR-10 IO-13 NSAE-00 EB-08 NRC-05
SOE-02 DODE-00 DOE-15 SS-15 SP-02 CEQ-01 EUR-12
H-01 PA-01 ICAE-00 /120 W
-----036091 241216Z /53

O 241042Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9490
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 6976

E.O. 11652:N/A
TAG: PARM, TECH, ENRG, IR
SUBJ: IRANIAN/FRG PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND
STATUS-BILATERAL AGREEMENT

REF: A. STATE 183940, B. STATE 185382, C. STATE 183711

1. ETEMAD PRESS CONFERENCE FEBRUARY 6, 1977 INCLUDED
QUESTION & ANSWER PERIOD CONCERNING SPECTRUM OF NUCLEAR
MATTERS. QUESTIONS ASKED BY R. MOHAN OF INDIAN EXPRESS,
AND ETEMAD COMMENTS ON DOMESTIC FUEL REPROCESSING PLANS
WERE PROVIDED FROM AEOI FILES. AEOI TRANSLATION FROM FARSI
WAS REVIEWED WITH MANZOOR. PARENTHETICAL ADDITIONS HAVE
BEEN MADE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARIFICATION AND TO REMOVE
AMBIGUITY FROM FARSI TO ENGLISH TRANSLATION. QUOTE.
QUESTION: R. MOHAN FROM INDIAN EXPRESS. I HAVE THREE
QUESTIONS. FIRST QUESTION. WERE SOME OF THE IRANIAN
NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS TRAINED IN INDIA? SECOND QUESTION:
THIS POST IRRADIATION; ARE YOU TRYING TO SAY THAT THIS
WILL NOT LEAD TO MANUFACTURE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, BECAUSE
THAT IS THE MAIN OBJECTION TO REPROCESSING PLANTS? THIRD
QUESTION: DOES IRAN EXPECT TO BE IN THE SIMILAR SITUATION
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WITH BRAZIL AND PAKISTAN? EVENTUALLY WHEN YOU SIGN (THE
AGREEMENT) WITH U.S., THEN IT IS THE SAME PROBLEM?
ANSWER: DR. ETEMAD: I DIDN'T GET YOUR THIRD QUESTION.
QUESTION: BRAZIL AND PAKISTAN ARE HAVING PROBLEM BECAUSE
U.S. DOESN'T WANT THE REPROCESSING PLANT. EVENTUALLY, YOU
WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A REPROCESSING PLANT? ANSWER:
DR ETEMAD: NO, I DIDN'T SAY THAT. PARAGRAPH. NONE OF

THE IRANIAN SCIENTISTS AS FAR AS I KNOW RIGHT NOW HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN INDIA. IT MIGHT HAPPEN THAT ONE OR TWO OR THREE HAVE BEEN FOR A CERTAIN TIME IN INDIA, BUT AS FAR AS I KNOW THEY ARE NOT THE MAJOR SCIENTISTS WHO ARE WORKING IN IRAN, BUT WE INTEND VERY SERIOUSLY TO HAVE A COOPERATION WITH INDIA NOT ONLY FOR THE TRAINING OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS FOR OUR PROGRAM FOR WHICH THEY ARE VERY WELL (IN TRAINING), BUT ALSO FOR OTHER TECHNICAL PURPOSES, AND I HOPE PERSONALLY THAT THIS COOPERATION IS GOING TO START VERY SOON. PARAGRAPH. NOW, CONCERNING THE REPROCESSING, I SHOULD REMIND YOU OF THE ANSWER THAT I HAVE GIVEN, THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO HAVE A REPROCESSING PLANT IN IRAN AND WE ARE LOOKING AT VARIOUS SOLUTIONS WHICH MIGHT EMERGE ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL IN ORDER TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM FOR US. PARAGRAPH. IN SAYING THAT, WE DON'T ENVISAGE THE PROBLEMS (IMPLICIT IN YOUR QUESTION). IF WE DON'T HAVE IT WE CANNOT MISUSE IT. THIS THIRD QUESTION IS THAT THE CASE OF BRAZIL AND PAKISTAN IS NOT GOING TO HAPPEN FOR IRAN BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT MADE CONTRACTS FOR THAT KIND OF EQUIPMENT WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS SENSITIVE AND FOR WHICH THE U.S. IS SO ANXIOUS RIGHT NOW. QUESTION: THIS POST IRRADIATION I WAS ASKING ABOUT, (THEN WHAT ARE YOU EXACTLY PLANNING TO DO WITH THE WASTE OR POST IRRADIATION MATERIAL? DOESN'T THE SPENT FUEL IMPLY PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS?) WHAT EXACTLY DOES THAT MEAN? DOES IT MEAN MANUFACTURE WEAPON LATER? IS THAT WHY WE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ARE AFRAID OF REPROCESSING? ANSWER: NO. IN THE POST IRRADIATION STAGE WE WON'T HAVE REPROCESSING (IN IRAN AS I SAID) AND IF WE REPROCESS, IT IS SOMEWHERE OUTSIDE IRAN. (WHAT THE QUESTION FORESEES,) IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. (PER MANZOOR; THE REASON AEOI DECIDED NOT TO HAVE DOMESTIC REPROCESSING IS, FIRST, BECAUSE IT TENDS TO ADD DIFFICULTY TO NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES, WHICH IS COUNTER TO NPT GOALS AND, SECONDLY, IRAN BELIEVES IT WOULD OPPOSE ITS INTEREST IN SUPPORTING A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE THROUGH PRACTICES WHICH COULD REPRESENT POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION INITIATIVES. IRAN HAS STATED ITS ADVOCACY OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE IN THE UNITED NATIONS FORUM.) END QUOTE.

2. EMBASSY AND AEOI FILES WERE REVIEWED FOR PUBLIC STATEMENTS PER REF A PARA 3 WITHOUT SUCCESS.

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ACTION L-03

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CIAE-00 INR-10 IO-13 NSAE-00 EB-08 NRC-05 SOE-02

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SCIATT DISCUSSED THE FRG AGREEMENT WITH BOTH MANZOOR AND GERMAN EMBASSY SCIATT. WE UNDERSTAND FROM BOTH SOURCES THAT GENERAL AGREEMENT SIGNED DOES NOT RPT NOT ADDRESS ARRANGMENTS ON SENSITIVE TECHNICAL INFORMATION INCLUDING REPROCESSING; NEITHER THIS GENERAL AGREEMENT NOR SPECIFIC LATER ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN AEOI AND KWU INCLUDE A DETDDBPION OF COOPERATION FOR REPROCESSING. DR. MANZOOR STATED THAT HE BELIEVES AN UNWRITTEN CONSENSUS NOW EXISTS BETWEEN FRG AND IRAN(AND FRANCE AS WELL) WHICH CONCERNS SOME ACCOMMODATION IN THIS MATTER. THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN AEOI AND KWU DEALS WITH SUCH SUBJECTS AS THE TEN YEAR NUCLEAR FUEL OPTION, PHYSICAL SECURITY, ETC., AND PRESUMABLY REMAINS SILENT ON THE MATTER OF REPROCESSING. COOPERATION.

3. EMBASSY CONTINUES TO SEEK INFORMATION ON REF A PARA 2A DEALING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE. POLMIL COUNSELOR MARTIN RETURNS TO POST LATER THIS WEEK. WE WILL REVIEW THIS SUBJECT AND ADVISE FURTHER. FROM SCIATT CONVERSTAION WITH MANZOOR, EMBASSY BELIEVES SHAH MAY HAVE MADE STATEMENT AT PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON RECENTLY. IF DEPT KNOWS MONTH IN WHICH REMARKS WERE MADE, IT WOULD
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ASSIST SEARCH HERE. PLEASE ADVISE. FOLLOWING IS RELATED EXCERPT FROM SHAH'S TELEVISION INTERVIEW OF 12 NOVEMBER 1976, CARRIED BY FINANCIAL TIMES ON NOVEMBER 13, 1976. QUOTE: THE SHAH, WHO RECENTLY SIGNED AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE FOR THE SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR PLANTS, WAS ASKED WHETHER IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT IRAN MIGHT BE A CANDIDATE

FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PARAGRAPH. HE SAID: "THAT'S VERY, VERY REMOTE, I SAY ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE." PARAGRAPH. THE SHAH SAID THAT IF IRAQ, LIBYA, OR SOME OTHER PEOPLE TRIED TO GET NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD DID NOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT THEN THE QUESTION WOULD ARISE: WHAT TO DO? PARAGRAPH. "BUT WE HAVE GOT TO DO SOMETHING AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS. WE HAVE GOT TO DO THAT ON THE WORLD SCALE." PARAGRAPH. HE SAID IRAN'S DEAL WITH FRANCE WAS NOT FOR FUEL REPROCESSING FACILITIES,. "THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES. ONE IS TO HAVE THE GUARANTEE THAT, OF FUEL, SPENT FUEL WILL BE REPROCESSED IN THE U.S. OR IN FRANCE," HE SAID. REUTER. UNQUOTE. ADDITIONALLY, QUESTION AND ANSWER EXCHANGE BY SHAH IN INTERVIEW GRANTED TO SENIOR EDITOR NEWSWEEK (ARNOLD DE BORCHGRAVE) IN NOVEMBER, 1977, FOLLOWS: QUOTE: QUESTION: ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA ARE KNOWN TO HAVE MILITARY NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES(JOHN VORSTER CONFIRMED IT TO ME 18 MONTHS AGO), THOUGH THEY BOTH DENY IT. UNLESS THE WORLD CHANGES DRASTICALLY, WHAT ARE YOUR OWN INTENTIONS IN THIS FIELD? SHAHANSHAH: SO FAR NON-NUCLEAR. AGAINST WHOM SHOULD WE HAVE SUCH WEAPONS? MY IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURS AND WE WILL TRY TO MANAGE TO COPE WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. AS FOR THE USSR, IT'S UTTERLY RIDICULOUS TO ARM YOURSELF WITH TWO OR THREE NUCLEAR DEVICES AGAINST ALL THEIR MEGATONS. END QUOTE.

4. IN SCIATT DISCUSSIONS WITH MANZOOR RE BILATERAL, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PERTINENT REFS B AND C INFORMATION WAS OUTLINED. MANZOOR IS FORWARDING INITIALLED AGREEMENT IN BOTH ENGLISH AND FARSI TO FORMIN THIS WEEK FOR FINAL LEGAL REVIEW. HE ESTIMATES ONE WEEK OR TEN DAYS NEEDED FOR THIS ACTIVITY; DOCUMENTS WILL BE RETURNED TO HIM BY FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WILL THEN BE SENT TO PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE WITH REQUEST THAT ETEMAD SIGN ON BEHALF OF GOI. MANZOOR ESTIMATES APPROXIMATELY SIXTEEN TO SEVENTTEN DAYS TOTAL FOR GOI PREPARATION FOR SIGNATURE.

5. UPON COMPLETION FOREIGN MINISTRY'S LEGAL REVIEW OF THE BILATERAL, MANZOOR WILL PROVIDE COPY OF FARSI TEXT TO EMBASSY FOR DEPARTMENT'S USE.
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Message Attributes

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Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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